Quintus

Agreed there are several issues which come to mind: 1. Latency advantage for builders close to the relay, because of information asymmetry and just-in-time bidding. 2. This adds further incentive...

In my view the key focus should be preventing proposer centralisation - after all, this was the original motivation for PBS implementation - and this is best done by examining...

There is a lot to be said on the topic of identifying "toxic" MEV. For starters, it's not easy (or possible?) to identify cases of front-running or sandwiching. For example,...

Thanks for a thorough response @jldunne. Yes I agree that if builders are willing to take a loss to have a block included then this situation is less of a...

Most blocks aren’t full. EIP1559 is designed so that blocks are always ~50% full (15m gas I think). It’s only at times when demand spikes that blocks are full. A...

The idea does assume a public mempool. It could end up being the case that the majority of transactions end up moving to builders via other channels for a variety...

> > If conditions are violated, relayer reputation is adjusted/proposer no longer accepts headers from relay > > What if instead of punishing the builder, the relay only relays crlist-compatible...

I've been thinking about the issue of forming crlists without changing the EL/CL clients and came up with two potential routes. I don't have sufficient technical familiarity with everything I...

> mandate that "honest" proposers forgo the builder network in lieu of their local builder w/ public mempool every N of M slots. I agree that this is a reasonable...

Yeah this is the most shaky part. You can probably back out the proposers IP after it has proposed a few blocks. If we could get some kind of IP...